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purchases or obtains a lien on the debtor's property after the deal is terminated.
The financing statement was designed merely to provide constructive notice of
a possible security interest. Such a third party could not be expected to analyze
correctly every phrase in the financing statement that could possibly be con-
strued as a grant of a security interest and give the original proposed secured
party a preferred interest in the property. If the warning Evans implies is
heeded, the debtor may find that the existence of the financing statement in-
hibits transfer or further borrowing against his property. The situation urgently
needs correction.
Bob Harrison
Foreign Purchasers and Sellers: Is There a Different
Standard of Due Process for Asserting Jurisdiction?
Craftsman Hardwood Lumber Company, an Illinois corporation, ordered
a quantity of lumber from Riverland Hardwood Company, a Louisiana corpo-
ration. The amount of the purchase was $7,960.92, and Riverland furnished
the ordered quantity to Craftsman. Riverland later sought to recover the pur-
chase price from Craftsman by a suit in the courts of Louisiana. Craftsman had
neither a license to do business in Louisiana nor an agent appointed to receive
service of process. Craftsman excepted to the assertion of jurisdiction over it by
the Louisiana court, and the exceptions were sustained. The Louisiana Court
of Appeals affirmed,1 and Riverland was granted certiorari by the Supreme
Court of Louisiana.2 Held, affirmed: A single purchase by a foreign corporation
does not constitute sufficient "transacting of business" to satisfy the require-
ments of due process. Riverland Hardwood Co. v. Craftsman Hardwood
Lumber Co., 251 So. 2d 45 (La. 1971).
I. IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
The Legal Fictions. At common law a corporation was deemed to be a creature
of the state in which it was incorporated.3 Its legal existence flowed only from
that state, and, as a result, in personam jurisdiction could not be asserted over
the corporation in any other state.4 Of course, this theory proved unsatisfactory
when commercial activities became national in scope, and it was replaced by
two other theories supporting assertion of jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tions. The first of these was that doing business in a state constituted "implied
consent" to the assertion of jurisdiction.5 The second theory was that doing
'239 So. 2d 465 (La. App. 1970).
2251 So. 2d 45 (La. App. 1971).
3 See, e.g., St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 353-59 (1882), and the historical discussion
therein.4 See, e.g., Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189 (1915).
'See, e.g., Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602 (1899); Lafayette
Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. 404 (1855). In Spratley, the Court stated: "The act did not
provide for an express consent to receive such service, on the part of the company. The con-
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business in a state meant that the foreign corporation was physically "present,"
and, therefore, amenable to service of process and jurisdiction.! Obviously,
both theories hinged on "doing business," and the question of what constituted
"doing business" became a problem of sizable proportions.!
International Shoe and Its Aftermath. In International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton8 the Supreme Court of the United States held that for the assertion of
jurisdiction the due process clause required only "minimum contacts" between
the foreign corporations and the forum state such that an in personam suit
against the foreign corporation would not "offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."' The "minimum contacts" test was designed to
avoid the determination of jurisdiction by mechanical or quantitative factors,
and to allow a more flexible analysis of the nature and quality of the trans-
action." Inconvenience to the corporate defendant and the interests of the
forum state were the primary factors weighed by the Court.11 Although Inter-
national Shoe made it clear that the prior rigid tests were replaced with a "fair-
ness" test, the Court did not specifically enunciate any other factors to be con-
sidered in determining fairness.
Subsequent developments in the law have indicated that the factors to be
considered include inconvenience to the parties, interests of the forum state,
and interest in efficient judicial administration."5 Inconvenience would include
sent was implied because of the company entering the State and doing business therein ......
172 U.S. at 614 (emphasis added).
'See, e.g., Philadelphia R.R. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917); International Har-
vester Co. of America v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914); St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Alexander,
227 U.S. 218 (1913); Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907). In
McKibbin the Court stated: "A foreign corporation is amenable to process to enforce a per-
sonal liability, in the absence of consent, only if it is doing business within the State in such
a manner and to such extent as to warrant the inference that it is present there." 243 U.S.
at 265. Similarly, in International Harvester the Court stated: "We are satisfied that the
presence of a corporation within a State necessary to the service of process is shown when
it appears that the corporation is there carrying on business in such sense as to manifest its
presence within the State. ... 234 U.S. at 589.
For definitions of "doing business" see, e.g., Edgewater Realty Co. v. Tennessee Coal,
Iron & R.R. Co., 49 F. Supp. 807 (D. Md. 1943); McMaster v. Robinson's Women's Ap-
parel, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 99 (D. Neb. 1942); Yellow Mfg. Acceptance Corp. v. American
Oil Co., 191 Miss. 757, 2 So. 2d 834 (1941); Malleable Iron Range Co. v. Ford, 141
S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1940); Goldberry v. Carter, 100 Va. 438, 41
S.E. 858 (1902). But cf. Harnischfeger Sale Corp. v. Sternberg Co., 179 La. 317, 154
So. 10 (1934) (doing business although only one contract was made in Louisiana); Tripp
State Bank v. Jerke, 45 S.D. 448, 188 N.W. 314 (1922); Buhler v. E.T. Burrowes Co.,
171 S.W. 791 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1914).
a326 U.S. 310 (1945).
'Id. at 316.
10 "It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line between those
activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which do not,
cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative. The test is not merely .. .whether the ac-
tivity ...is a little more or a little ss. . . .Whether due process is satisfied must depend
rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly ad-
ministration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure." Id.
at 319. See Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Juris-
diction of State Courts, 25 U. Cm. L. RBV. 569 (1958). Sea also Kilpatrick v. Texas &
Pac. Ry., 166 F.2d 788 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1948); Bomze v. Nardis
Sportswear, 165 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1948); Green v. Equitable Powder Mfg. Co., 99 F. Supp.
237 (W.D. Ark. 1951).11 326 U.S. at 317, 319.
" Developments in the Law: State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909 (1960).
(Vol. 26
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the cost of defending or prosecuting a suit in a foreign state, what each party
has at stake, and which party is best capable of spreading litigation costs.
Interests of the forum state in International Shoe were direct because Washing-
ton was seeking payment of unemployment compensation taxes. Indirect state
interests may also be considered. These would include a state's interest in pro-
tecting its citizens from unsafe products or tortious acts by nonresidents."4
Efficient judicial administration would include such considerations as where
witnesses live and which state law will be applied.'"
Louisiana's Long-Arm Statute." Louisiana has traditionally sought to allow
the assertion of jurisdiction in any case in which such assertion would be
permissible under the due process clause as it has been interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court.' An 1890 Louisiana statute required that an
agent be appointed before a license to do business would be issued to a foreign
corporation, and a 1914 statute allowed for substituted service of process on
the Louisiana Secretary of State."9 In response to International Shoe Louisiana
enacted a statute requiring appointment of an agent to do business and allow-
ing for substituted service of process for all foreign corporations "engaged in
business activities" in Louisiana."0 After McGee v. International Life Insurance
See also McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (emphasizing incon-
venience and protection of the resident plaintiff).
"3 Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal Devices, 24 COLUM.
L. REV. 335 (1924). See also McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24(1957); O'Hare Int'l Bank v. Hampton, 437 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1971); Hyde Constr. Co.
v. Koehring Co., 321 F. Supp. 1193 (S.D. Miss. 1969).
4This would be indirect because the forum state is not being denied anything, as it
was in International Shoe (revenues). For examples of torts giving rise to jurisdiction see
Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963) (negligent manufacture of a
water heater); W.H. Elliott & Sons v. Noudux Prods. Co., 243 F.2d 116 (1st Cit. 1957)(negligent manufacture of paint chemicals); Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116
Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951) (negligent house repair).
15 "[S]uits on alleged losses can be more conveniently tried in Virginia where witnesses
would most likely live .... ." Travellers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp.
Comm'n, 339 U.S. 643, 649 (1950). See also Ciprari v. Servicos Aereos Cruzeiro do Sul,
S.A., 232 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
"LA. REV. STAT. § 13:3201 (1968). The statute reads:
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, who acts di-
rectly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the nonresident's(a) transacting any business in this state; (b) contracting to supply services
or things in this state; (c) causing injury or damage by an offense or quasi
offense committed through an act or omission in this state; (d) causing injury
or damage in this state by an offense or quasi offense committed through an
act or omission outside of this state if he regularly does or solicits business, or
engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial reve-
nue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this state; or (e)
having an interest in, using, or possessing a real right or immovable property
in this state.
' Comment, Jurisdiction In Personam-The Due Process Framework and the Louisiana
Experience, 26 LA. L. REV. 351 (1966); Comment, Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresi-
dents-The Louisiana Long-Arm Statute, 40 TUL. L. REV. 366 (1966). The Texas view
is very similar to the Louisiana view. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § 4 (1964)
has been stated to be an attempt by Texas "to exploit to the maximum the fullest permis-
sible reach under federal constitutional restraints." Lone Star Motor Import, Inc. v. Citroen
Cars Corp., 288 F.2d 69, 73 (5th Cir. 1961). See also Thode, In Personam Jurisdiction:
Article 2031B, The Texas "Long-Arm" Jurisdiction Statute: And the Appearance To Chal-
lenge Jurisdiction in Texas and Elsewhere, 42 TEXAS L. REV. 279 (1964).
" No. 149, § 1, (1890] La. Acts 1.
No. 267, § 26, [1914) La. Acts 1.
No. 21, § 1, [1950] La. Acts 1, as amended, LA. REV. STAT. § 13:3471(D) (1950).
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Co."1 the provision was amended to read "engaged in a business activity."2
The current Louisiana statute was enacted in 1964 and employs the language
"transacting any business in this state."' The comment on the statute by the
Louisiana Law Institute states that "transacting business" is much broader than
"doing business" and "is intended to mean a single transaction. '"" This would
allow the assertion of jurisdiction in cases in which such assertion arguably
violated the standard of "fair play and substantial justice.""
In Aucoin v. Hanson"6 a Louisiana resident purchased a mare from a resident
of Mississippi. The Louisiana resident later sued in Louisiana to recover the
purchase price of the mare. The court sustained jurisdiction under the "trans-
acting any business" section of the long-arm statute, even though the de-
fendant's only direct contact with Louisiana was through several long distance
telephone calls with the Louisiana resident. The court stated:
The record supports the proposition that the agreement here in question was
perfected in all significant regards in a telephone conversation between Mr.
Hanson in Mississippi, and Mr. Aucoin in Louisiana. It is impossible to de-
termine which party made the final acceptance of the terms of the other; nor
do we feel that determination to be essential. The contract appears to be as
much a 'Louisiana contract' as it is a 'Mississippi contract.' 7
II. RIVERLAND HARDWOOD Co. V. CRAFTSMAN HARDWOOD LUMBER CO.
In Riverland Hardwood Co. v. Craftsman Hardwood Lumber Co.2" the
court acknowledged the fact that the Louisiana statute would not even forbid
the exercise of jurisdiction over mail order purchasers." Of course, such an
assertion would be unique because, as the court pointed out, neither party was
able to find precedent for asserting jurisdiction on the basis of a single pur-
chase. ° If the purchases were over an extended period and as a regular part
of the purchaser's business, jurisdiction could be asserted."' Any statute allow-
ing assertion of jurisdiction, however, must satisfy the due process require-
2 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
2 No. 32, § 1, [1960] La. Acts 1, as amended, LA. REV. STAT. 5 13:3471 (1950).23 LA. REV. STAT. § 13:3201(a) (1968).
"
4 See Comments of the Louisiana State Law Institute--1964, 7 LA. REV. STAT. 68
(1968).
' "At some point, however, activity in the state could meet the literal requirement of
section 3201 (a) but be so insignificant that the exercise of jurisdiction would be uncon-
stitutional." Comment, Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents-The Louisiana Long-Arm
Statute, 40 TuL. L. REV. 366, 377 (1966).
2 207 So. 2d 834 (La. App. 1968).
"
7 1d. at 837-38.
26251 So. 2d 45 (La. 1971).
" The court cited Henry R. Jahn & Son v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d
437, 440-41 (1958), in which it was stated: "In some circumstances there is adequate basis
for jurisdiction when the defendant has elected to deal with the plaintiff even though only
by mail."
"The New York long-arm statute, N.Y. CIv. PROC. LAW § 302(a) (McKinney
1972), uses the same phrase, "transacting any business," and in Steele v. Deleeuw, 40
Misc. 2d 207, 244 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1963), the assertion of jurisdiction over a foreign cor-
poration was upheld when a director of that corporation executed a single contract in New
York for the purchase of stock.
"' Star Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Red Ash Pocahontas Coal Co., 102 F. Supp. 258 (E.D. Ky.
1951); Henry R. Jahn & Son v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d 437 (1958);
Sterling Novelty Corp. v. Frank & Hirsch Distrib. Co., 299 N.Y. 208, 86 N.E.2d 564
(1949).
(Vol. 26
ments of the fourteenth amendment set out in International Shoe. In a brief
discussion of International Shoe and McGee the court set forth the factors to
be considered under the "fairness" test, then disregarded those factors. The
court stated that they were too imprecise, and that the court itself "must de-
cide whether there is a difference between foreign purchasers and foreign
sellers with respect to the due process clause."3 The court concluded that there
was such a difference.
The court reasoned that foreign sellers are aware of the fact that they
may be subjected to jurisdiction in a foreign state." Sellers who sell in a foreign
state also should be aware that they must usually go to the state of the pur-
chaser to sue on the transaction.4 These jurisdiction problems are expected, and
are a risk of selling in foreign states. Purchasers, on the other hand, would find
nothing in any state law that would lead them to believe that a single mail
order "might get [them] sued a thousand miles from home if [they) fail to
pay .... ." In addition, sellers are "usually participating in a business activity
for profit,"' while purchasers include a great many "ultimate consumers" not
in pursuit of a profit, but merely purchasing to satisfy personal desires and
needs.Y" Although at the outset the court acknowledged that "[allmost by
definition, to purchase is to do business,"3 the court later stated that "[bjuying
is not traditionally the same as doing business."3 The court ended the dis-
cussion of the differences between foreign buyers and foreign sellers by stating
that purchasers who know they may be sued in Louisiana would obviously
conduct their business "where the risk and cost of litigation are not increased;""
or, in other words, where there is no chance of getting sued.4'
The court stated that it would not fix a minimum value on purchases which
would subject the purchaser to jurisdiction in Louisiana. If jurisdiction would
not be asserted over an "ultimate consumer, not in business connected with the
purchase, and when the purchase is of relatively small value,"' and if the
court refused to place a value on what sized purchase would give jurisdiction
to Louisiana, then regardless of the size of a purchase, it would appear that
jurisdiction could not be asserted on the basis of a purchase.
251 So. 2d 45, 47 (1971).
'See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). If a state sets no
standard higher than that set forth in International Shoe, then the foreign corporation should
be aware of the risk of being sued once it establishes "minimum contacts."
" The court stated: "[Clorporations who sell in a foreign state should be aware that
nearly every state, to this moment requires that they go to the residence of the purchaser
to sue on a claim arising from the transaction." 251 So. 2d at 47. It should be noted that
here the plaintiff sold to Craftsman, an Illinois corporation, in Louisiana, not in Illinois.
Craftsman came to the plaintiff in Louisiana with an offer to purchase.
" 251 So. 2d at 47. The statement is correct with respect to a single mail order purchase
by an "ultimate consumer." Clearly, in that instance there are no "minimum contacts."
86 Id.
" While it is true that there are probably more "ultimate consumers" among interstate
purchasers than among sellers, there are certainly interstate purchasers seeking a profit as
well. See, e.g., Henry R. Jahn & Son v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 860, 323 P.2d 437,
440-41 (1958).
"3251 So. 2d at 46.
" ld. at 47.
40 Id.
4' The court's implication is that if they allow the assertion of jurisdiction for any single
purchase, then Louisiana would be an unfavorable place for purchase so long as other states
retain their reluctance to assert jurisdiction over purchasers as readily as over sellers.
'251 So. 2d at 47.
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III. DISTINGUISHING PURCHASERS AND SELLERS
WITH RESPECT TO DUE PROCESS
The denial of jurisdiction in the present case is not at all surprising. How-
ever, the fact that the court effectively abandoned the "fairness" test of Inter-
national Shoe is surprising. The first step the court took was to determine that
the Louisiana long-arm statute did not set a standard above that set by the
Supreme Court for assertion of jurisdiction."' The next logical step would be
to discuss the due process requirements and the factors which would be used
to see if the requirements were met. Although the court discussed these factors,
it did not apply them to the facts of the case. Balancing the interests of the
parties involved, the interest of the forum state, and the interest of judicial
administration would more than likely call for the same adjudication as the
court made; however, the court chose to distinguish between foreign purchasers
and foreign sellers.
Several long-arm statutes allow for the assertion of jurisdiction because of
a single contract," but the assertion of jurisdiction over a foreign purchaser for
a single purchase is rare." The differences between purchasers and sellers dis-
cussed by the court where based upon the assumption that the seller is usually
large and its connections with the forum state are substantial, while the pur-
chaser is pictured as an "ultimate consumer" making a single mail order
purchase. Clearly, under such a fact situation, jurisdiction could not be asserted
without violating due process. However, the court simply overlooked the pur-
chaser who has the requisite "minimum contacts." The irony of this decision
is that if Louisiana refuses to assert jurisdiction over an unsuspecting "ulti-
mate consumer" who made one mail order purchase, then Louisiana cannot
assert jurisdiction over a foreign purchaser in business for profit who makes
a sizable single purchase from a resident corporation."
The Louisiana act provides for the assertion of jurisdiction over foreign cor-
porations for "transacting any business." That phrase is probably broader than
"doing business,"4 so the question becomes whether the purchase of articles
from a Louisiana resident is sufficient for "minimum contacts" with Louisiana.
In spite of the statute, the mere doing of business in this manner has not
moved Louisiana courts to assert jurisdiction.4" Typically, it has been held that
' "R.S. 13:3201 through 13:3207 were adopted on the recommendation of the Louisi-
ana State Law Institute to permit the courts of this state to tap the full potential of juris-
diction in personam over nonresidents permitted by International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 .... and McGee v. International Life Insurance Company, 355 U.S.-220 ...."
Comments of the Louisiana State Law Institute-1964, 13 LA. REV. STAT. 68 (1968).
44See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. S 33-411(c) (1961); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23,
§ 92(d) (1957); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 600.705(4)-(5) (1968); MINN. STAT.
§ 303.13(1) (3) (1969).
15 "The general tendency of the courts to require less in the way of sales activity to
bring a foreign corporation within the jurisdiction of a state has not been accompanied
by any parallel lessening of requirements as to purchasing activities." Waltham Precision
Instrument Co. v. McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 203 F. Supp. 539, 541 (D. Mass. 1962).
See also Steele v. Deleeuw, 40 Misc. 2d 207, 244 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1963).
"In Henry R. Jahn & Son v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d 437 (1958),
the Supreme Court of California stated that there was no difference between regular sellers
and regular buyers as far as jurisdiction was concerned.
.'Comment, Jurisdiction In Personam Over Contracts with Nonresidents, 26 LA. L.
REV. 372, 376 (1966).
"See, e.g., Bowlero, Inc. v. Allen, 205 So. 2d 196 (La. App. 1967).
[Vol. 26
there must be some act or acts which place the nonresident in the position of
enjoying the benefit and protection of the laws of the state of Louisiana."
Aucoin v. Hanson"0 illustrated the fact that foreign sellers are more readily
subjected to jurisdiction than foreign purchasers, and thus it appears that
foreign purchasers enjoy a form of relative immunity from jurisdiction in
Louisiana. Craftsman surely had more "contact" with Louisiana than Mr. Han-
son, yet jurisdiction was sustained over Hanson but not over Craftsman. The
difference can only be attributed to the fact that Hanson sold to a Louisiana
resident, while Craftsman bought from a Louisiana resident.
IV. CONCLUSION
If the foreign purchaser has little at stake in comparison to the resident
seller,' and if the sale was consummated in the forum state so that all the
witnesses live there, then the purchaser should be subject to the jurisdiction of
the forum state. 2 Riverland v. Craftsman precludes Louisiana courts from as-
serting jurisdiction if and when a case involving a single, but sizable, purchase
comes before the courts of Louisiana again. Not only is this case a defeat for
the broad legislative intent in Louisiana in this regard, but it also represents
the kind of mechanical and quantitative analysis International Shoe abandoned
twenty-seven years ago.
Generally, less sales activity than purchasing activity is required to assert
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation." This seeming unfairness is not due to
any inherent differences between sellers and buyers, and the long-arm statutes
make no such distinction. The level of commercial activity required for juris-
diction ought to be determined uniformly by the interest balancing test set
forth by the Supreme Court in International Shoe and McGee. As things cur-
rently stand, foreign sellers get "less" due process because jurisdiction can and
will be asserted over them more readily than over foreign purchasers. If the
interests of the foreign purchaser are weighed against those of the resident
seller and found to be of less weight, the assertion of jurisdiction would not
violate "fair play," and consequently the forum state ought to sustain juris-
diction over the foreign purchaser.
Mark C. Clements
4 9 Aucoin v. Hanson, 207 So. 2d 834 (La. App. 1968). See also Terasse v. Wisconsin
Feeder Pig Mkt. Coop., 202 So. 2d 330 (La. App. 1967).
' 207 So. 2d 834 (La. App. 1968).
" Marginal values might be considered when both parties had the same dollar value
at stake, but the resident seller's business was considerably smaller than the business of
the foreign purchaser. Presumably, in this instance, one dollar would be of greater value
to the smaller seller than to the larger purchaser.
51 Comment, supra note 47, at 387. It was stated there:
The advantages of the 'long-arm' statutes are, for the most part, clearly evi-
dent. A state is enabled, by means of the statute, to protect its residents' in-
terests. The old tests of 'presence' and 'domicile,' which often produced unfair
results, are discarded. The nonresident who enters a state . . . is choosing to
deal commercially with a person in whose welfare the forum state has an
interest. That a nonresident who expects to enjoy or actually enjoys profit
should accept as a cost of doing business the expense of defending in the
state is only right.
See also Ganz, "Doing Business" in Illinois as a Basis of jurisdiction Over Nonresidents-
Due Process and Contacts, 1 ILL. CONTINUING LEGAL ED., No. 4, Oct. 1963, at 75.
"' See note 45 supra.
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